Primer on MMRCA saga: Technology Leapfrogging or Geopolitical Grand Strategy?

The results of the technical evaluation for Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender, worth an estimated $11 billion, has been recently released by India and there has been a lot of back slapping, hand wringing and heartburn amongst the competitors. The French Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon have made the cut and will begin the commercial negotiation phase very soon. The others - namely, Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet & Lockheed Martin's F16 Viper from USA, Saab Grippen JAS-39 from Sweden and MiG-35 from Russia - have been left to lament their fortunes after the results were out.

There has been a lot of feedback from various quarters on the outcome of the downselect for this competition. Many commentators were surprised at the exclusion of the American aircrafts, which were billed as the favourites. Many were equally surprised at the inclusion of the Rafale given France’s inability to find buyers in the export markets so far. While the Americans were pretty vocal about their disappointment, the French and Europeans were naturally very happy at the turn of events. Political commentators and security analysts have also articulated a wide variety of views ranging from congratulating the IAF for its choices to lamenting the lost opportunity for forging a much closer relationship with the US.

Before I articulate my views on the recent developments in this deal, I will give a brief background to educate and refresh the readers’ memories.

Why IAF needs MMRCA?

The Indian Air Force currently operates a variety of fighters ranging from MiGs 21, 27 & 29, Jaguars, Su-30 MKI, Mirage 2000. Of these, only the Mirage 2000 and the more recently inducted Su-30MKI can be classified as multi-role fighters with the rest optimised for one role over the other. The IAF has been sanctioned squadron strength of 39.5 for combat aircraft. With reduction in fleet strength because of retirement of aircrafts due to obsolescence and attrition from various accidents, the current squadron strength stands at 34.5 and is dwindling at a steady pace. This is inadequate for a two-front war, facing Pakistan and China at the same time, which is the most likely scenario for the next war that may be fought by us. The IAF has in fact requested that their squadron strength be raised to 45 to cater for the increased operations during war time across the two fronts. IAF has experienced declining squadron strength from the end of 1990's starting with the increased rate of accidents of MiG planes due to obsolescence and unavailability of spares. The bulk of the MiG fleet was to be retired sooner than later and this set the IAF on the path of requisitioning suitable replacements. Starting in 2005, the IAF has evinced interest in increasing fleet strength, with the Mirage 2000 being the preferred choice. Due to reasons beyond control of the IAF, the deal to acquire additional Mirages didn't fructify and it had to set about framing the requirements of the aircraft to fill the gap left by the retiring MiGs.

It is instructive to analyze how the IAF arrived at the medium range and multi-role capability for these aircrafts. Till the 1990’s, the fighter planes operated by IAF, except the Mirage 2000, were primarily oriented for one role viz. air defence, air superiority, ground strike missions, close air support, etc. The aircraft for these roles were highly optimised for their particular mission requirements and their flight characteristics and armament capability made them unsuitable to switch roles easily, sometimes impossible. The acquisition of Mirage 2000 from France in response to the Pakistan getting the F-16 from USA was the first truly multi-role aircraft for the IAF. It was designed as a platform capable of varying mission profiles carrying the requisite payload with not much difference in performance. The experience with Mirage 2000 started changing the outlook of the IAF in terms of operations, strategy and tactics. The best evidence of this is the acquisition of Su30 MKI and the transformation of the LCA Tejas from a MiG 21 replacement to Mirage 2000 equivalent over time. The IAF also acquired mid-air refuellers and AWACS aircraft in the first decade of 21^st century with an exclusive communication network giving it much greater power projection ability. With the bilateral and multilateral exercises with air forces of other countries, the IAF gained experience on air combat with different types of fighters and was able to develop an understanding on the types of combat aircraft that will be needed to cater to its current and future needs.

Based on this, the IAF formulated an aircraft mix of light, medium and heavy combat aircraft. The light end of the spectrum will be fulfilled by the indigenous LCA Tejas which will begin induction starting in 2012. The heavy combat aircraft are made up with Su-30 MKI. The medium combat aircraft is currently filled by Mirage 2000, which are primarily low in numbers and with a planned mid-life upgrade giving them an additional service life of 15 years at most. Thus there is a need to procure medium combat aircraft which can be inducted from 2015 onwards. This need prompted the IAF to formulate and issue the Request For Proposal (RFP) in 2005 to vendors around the world.

Around the same time just before the RFP was issued, the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) was also formulated and put in effect by the government. One of the clauses of the DPP stipulates the 30% of the value of any contract with a foreign vendor will have to be offset locally – procured or sourced from Indian firms in the private and public sector. This was aimed at developing and enhancing the capability and capacity of the nascent aviation industry in the country. The indigenization process was initiated through the LCA Tejas program which has resulted in a fair amount of work being done in India itself. The offset clause in the DPP sought to increase the collaboration with foreign vendors to acquire newer technologies which will eventually be absorbed and iteratively developed upon indigenously.

Thus the MMRCA tender can be seen as an effort to ramp up the declining numbers of combat fighters with some of the most-up-to-date aircraft while ensuring the local agencies are also able to absorb and develop current state-of-the-art technology available through this deal.

MMRCA down select and its fallout

After extensive technical evaluation covering over 643 parameters, the IAF short listed Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon as the aircraft that meet its exacting requirements. The technical evaluation was conducted over a variety of operating environments covering parameters for different mission profiles and armament capability within India as well as abroad at the vendors’ locations. In addition, the IAF also accounted for the operational and maintenance requirements as well as the technology on offer by the aircraft manufacturers. That Rafale and Eurofighter made it to the list after such an extensive and thorough evaluation speaks volumes of their quality and capability. The Swedish Grippen didn’t really stand much of a chance since it has been compared to our own LCA Tejas, thus putting it on a weaker position from the start itself. The Russian MiG 35 was also a doubtful candidate since it is only a prototype currently with India being the first customer if it had been chosen. This, in addition to the recent experiences with the Russians on other defence deals, left a sour taste for the IAF, which preferred not to put all its egg in one basket. The exclusion of the American planes was the most surprising development.

Once the results from the downselect were announced, there was widespread disappointment amongst many who had expected the American F16 & F/A-18 to be in the shortlist as well. There has been a lot of chatter on how the Americans will view this development. There was a very strong view that buying American jets will be the quid pro quo for the India-US nuclear deal that was signed in 2008. This deal gives India access to advanced nuclear technology for civilian purposes without crippling restrictions. Since US industry will not have much to offer us in terms of advanced nuclear technology, it was envisaged that military items will be purchased in lieu from them. This was supposed to be part of the strategic partnership being developed by India and US and buying 126 fighter jets expected to be a key milestone.

Commentators and analysts have criticized the rejection of US planes on the grounds that India chose to go for only planes rather than a relationship. Their arguments posited on the possible fallout of this rejection leading to hardening of the US stance towards India in various international forums. Another point raised was the number of Americans whose jobs could have been saved by this deal. This job savings/creation would have offset some of the bad press regarding outsourcing and off shoring to India. Another stream of thought lamented at the lost opportunity to field proven platforms with cutting edge technology already deployed – unlike other competitors who are still in prototype stage - from the acknowledged world leaders in the field. Collectively, the prevailing sense was that India could have generated enough clout with the US on the basis of this deal to enable a change in US stance towards India.

The India First view

To being with, I welcome the announcement of the MMRCA down select bringing to close the technical evaluation phase. That we have moved to the negotiation phase within six years of issuing the RFP itself is a commendable job by the IAF and MoD officials in light of some inordinately delayed defence deals. I concur with the IAF that Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon are the two most promising aircraft on offer to fill the gaps in our operational matrix and offer us the technology required by us. I will not comment on the Gripen and MiG 35 since, in my opinion, Gripen should never have been part of the competition and the MiG 35 was a paper plane more than anything else. On the contrary, I will rebut the claims of the commentators regarding the rejection of American planes.

The MMRCA competition was to procure contemporary, advanced combat aircrafts to address the shortfall in the squadron strength as well as develop the Indian industry to be capable of developing and manufacturing such jets. Thus the deal required the vendors to supply 18 planes initially from the plants abroad and then assemble the remaining the 108 planes in India itself through collaboration with public and/or private sector agencies. The offset requirement also required procurement of components worth 30% of the value of the deal from India itself. Given the state of the art technologies required in the planes, it is clear that the offset clause cannot be met without the transfer of technology by the vendors. In this manner, the deal sought to develop local industry and leapfrog the technology gap, to a great extent, in a single shot.

In this respect, the French Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoons have offered the most technologies for joint development and local production. Compared to this, the American offer was uninteresting, at best, or patronizing, at the worst. The F16 designed in the 1970’s has reached the end of the development potential for the airframe. No matter how much advanced technology can be added, the primary lacunae of a lesser capable airframe cannot be overcome. The F/A-18 Super Hornet is a more modern development being a major modification of the F/A-18 Hornet used by US Navy & Marines. Despite the redesign, the influences and limitations of the earlier design cannot be fully overcome. The avionics packages offered along with these planes included the AESA radar already in service with US but their capabilities would intentionally be handicapped with very little scope for and co-development.

US has been pursuing India to sign some mutual defence cooperation agreements since the nuclear deal was finalized so as to enhance the interaction between the militaries and provide access to the latest in defence equipment. These agreements viz. EUMA, CISMOA, LSA, etc have been looked upon with a degree of scepticism in India. The EUMA requires the end user to let the US inspect the equipment to ensure their integrity is not compromised. These inspections will enable the US Congress to permit the continued support for use of the equipment; else the supply of spares and services will be stopped. CISMOA will enable the equipment user to be integrated within the US system so they can work seamlessly in joint operations around the world. These two agreements more than others have created a very negative view of the American equipment. In effect, one can say that we are leasing the equipment from the US instead of buying it. This makes the availability of equipments suspect in the eyes of a military planner and hence unreliable. The combat jets, in question, will make up 15% of the combat fleet strength eventually. These planes may also be used for strategic purposes in the future, if so required. India will under no circumstance allow such restrictive actions on equipment it has purchased and deployed. I believe the fate of these planes was sealed when the US insisted that there wasn’t much it could do to change its procedures but something maybe worked out mutually, once the deal is signed. This attitude was compounded by the offer of older planes with avionics, whose capabilities will definitely be handicapped, and their general reluctance for local production and joint development of the planes. These are the factors which resulted in the elimination of the American planes from the contest more than any particular reason. In retrospect, it can be said that it was USA which offered just planes rather than a relationship.

While the job creation in US due to this deal was a valid point, it overlooks the jobs that have been created already with the purchase of six C130J transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force and eight P8I maritime surveillance planes for the Indian Navy. A deal for ten C17 Globemaster heavy lift transport aircraft is on the cards as well as is the purchase of ultra light howitzers guns for mountain warfare. Collectively, the value of these deals easily exceeds the MMRCA deal and will generate equal, if not more, jobs in the US. Even these items aren’t coming upto full specifications due to India’s non-acceptance of the various agreements mentioned earlier. This in itself signals Indian intent to develop a strategic partnership with the US, which has unfortunately not reciprocated favourably so far.

All those who argued about developing a clout for favourable impact India forget that investing a significant portion of our defence capabilities with the US gives them more clout to impact our decision making to their favour than otherwise.

The way ahead

The commercial phase of the competition will now being and its conclusion will reveal the winner of the tender. I wish the price negotiation committee the very best and hope they do a good job of coming up with a water tight agreement with clearly defined scope and deliverables along with penalties for non-compliance. This has been the bane of many deals in the past and given the thorough and professional manner in which the technical evaluation was conducted; one expects the commercial phase to be executed in a similar manner.

This deal has the potential to be the model deal which can be followed as a template for all such deals in the future for defence procurement, a sector which has been in the eye of the storm for alleged corruption since long.

India First - What's in a name?

I have been asked by some people about the title of my blog and its reasoning as they find it odd and too jingoistic, in some instances. This post is to give a brief background on why blog is titled India First.

I have always been interested in current affairs, geopolitics, international relations and national security, thanks in no small measure, to my parents for inculcating in me, the habit of reading newspapers and periodicals regularly. This naturally developed a curiosity and thirst for knowledge and set me on a never ending quest to keep myself current with all the developments on these topics. While there were many writers and columnists whose articles were read keenly, one person whose articles, interviews, op-eds and editorials I religiously followed was the late K.Subrahmanyam. KS sir, of course, has passed away recently after a prolonged and valiant fight with cancer and this post is not to offer any insight into his life and works, having never interacted with him in person or by mail unfortunately, when his peers, colleagues and students have more than eulogized him for his lifetime works as well as his singular achievement of seeding and nurturing the strategic studies culture in our country. Any follower of his articles will have noticed the various changes in positions he took over the course of his life on nuclear testing, nuclear cooperation deals, non-alignment, strategic alignment with Soviets and the realignment with US at the end of Cold War and many such issues, and be tempted to label him a flip-flop, who changed views to be on the right side always! Nothing can be farther from the truth, especially since he was known as the most hawkish person in the Indian establishment! To understand his varying positions, it is necessary to evaluate his views from the viewpoint of Indian interest, to realize the clarity with which he always articulated the best position for India at that point of time. He was not ashamed to shift his stance to suit the ever-changing world of geopolitics. He was steadfast in his goal of securing Indian interest at all times, even at the cost of personal embarrasment and public scorn. This was his most endearing quality to me and will be deeply etched in my mind for eternity.

Another person who set me about on the path of India First was my dearly departed mother. While she was the quintessential working woman in a middle class household aspiring to climb up the economic ladder, it never clouded her clarity on why it was necessary for the country's interests to be articulated and secured, even at the cost of short term economic hardship. This was evident at a small family gathering in the months following our Shakti II nuclear tests in May 1998. While everyone seemed to think that it was a foolish and suicidal move to have tested the nuclear devices inviting crippling economic sanctions on an already struggling economy, she held firm that it was necessary to do so and the price to pay, economic sanctions, will be a short term phenomenon,  as India opened up further economically making it unsustainable for any developed nation to isolate us and not partake in the multitude of opportunites that will be up for grabs. This was a very brave statement from a woman who was struggling to put her kids through higher education at a time when her husband's work had been affected significantly by the economic situation following the sanctions!

The above two instances, as mentioned, are the prime reasons for the title of my blog. I hope to do justice to the title by staying true and writing about issues and topics from an Indian viewpoint always. As can be seen, this is my second post in more than four months since it's been difficult to find the time to pen my thoughts on various topics given the pressures and demands of a full time job. Things have eased up a little on work front currently and I promise to be more regular in my posts and catch up to be current soon enough. The initial target will be to write a blog post every week before any increase in frequency can be thought of.